CAPITEC AND FNB VERY UNHELPFUL

It has been over three months since I fell victim to a ****, which I promptly reported to both my bank, Capitec, and FNB. Approximately three months ago, I encountered a group of sophisticated individuals posing as employees of the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) and a supplier named VACS. The *****ulent communication arrived via an email address ending with a .org domain, which typically denotes a trustworthy source. The email, presented as a request for proposal, sought the supply of 10 generators to the "DCS" within a specified timeframe.

The **** unfolded as follows: upon receiving the email from the purported DCS representatives, I conducted a search for a supplier capable of providing the specified generators within the given timeframe and product ID. The ****mers meticulously planned the deception by ensuring that only one supplier appeared in the search results for the specified product ID. Subsequently, I visited the supplier's website, which appeared highly professional and showcased a range of products. After contacting the supplier and receiving confirmation of their ability to assist, I responded to the "DCS" email, indicating my capability to supply the generators as an intermediary. The "DCS" approved my proposal, initiating communication with the supplier.

The supplier requested a deposit before shipping the equipment to the "DCS," setting the initial deposit amount at R50,000. As I lacked the full amount, we negotiated for me to make an immediate down payment of R23,000, with the commitment to pay the remainder upon receiving payment from the "DCS." The supplier provided updates on the supposed delivery progress, culminating in a call on Monday confirming the delivery at the "DCS."

Upon the "DCS" requesting an invoice and delivery note, I forwarded the latter, which indicated "Goods not cleared." The "DCS" claimed they couldn't process the payment due to this discrepancy, prompting my suspicions. Investigating further, I discovered that the supplier had only one contact number attributed to the sales manager, and the "DCS" consistently answered my calls with the same single individual.

Concerned by these anomalies, I contacted another number for the DCS found online, and the respondent confirmed that I was not the first victim of such a ****. Realizing the collaboration between the **** DCS and the supplier, I understood the extent of the deception after transferring the funds. My grievance lies with the banks, as I reported the ***** promptly, provided all necessary documents, including a case number from the SAPS, yet have received no assistance to date. The fact that the account to which I transferred funds is still active raises concerns about ongoing *****ulent activities through the same channels. This experience has left me profoundly disappointed in the banks' apparent lack of effort to investigate and support their customers, raising questions about their priorities and commitment to customer well-being.